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POWER POLITICS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR POLICY 
AND ELECTRICITY IN SCOTLAND 1973-89(1) 
RICHARD SA VILLE 
In the years after 1973 the energy situation in the major industrialised 
countries of Western Europe was transformed. The massive rise in oil 
prices inevitably led to policies which drastically reduced the use of oil, both 
in power stations and industry, and the shift to nuclear power for electricity 
generation was a trend that could be described as ineluctable. At the same 
time, for a combination of reasons, the imports of coal into the EEC by 
multinational energy companies sharply increased. It followed that the 
demand for indigenous steam and coking coal was steadily, and quite 
sharply reduced, and by the early eighties the mining industries of the 
Community faced one crisis after another. At the end of the decade deep-
mined coal was virtually extinct in Belgium, in certain important regions in 
France, and over much of the UK including Scotland. The timetable for 
completion of the 1992 EEC internal market saw further directions to this 
coal rundown. Energy is a crucial part of the overall economic policy the 
EEC will impose on member states in the nineties, and EEC policies are 
pro-nuclear and coal imports from multinational energy companies 
(MECs), and anti-EEC mined coal. But the eighties has also seen the first 
serious questioning in Europe of the economics of nuclear power. There 
has been a halt to most nuclear power stations (p/s) in the EEC apart from 
the UK and France. By 1988 all nuclear plant in Italy had been closed, and 
several countries announced that no further nuclear power stations would 
be built. 
This is the background to the UK discussions of the real costs of 
nuclear power. The public enquiries into Sizewell B and Hinckley C and the 
debates over the planned privatisation of electricity has forced into the 
open more realistic estimates of nuclear p/s costs, and a drastic revision of 
comparative total costs which show they are far more expensive than coal 
p/s, with costs which will continue long after closure. Under pressure from 
the City of London, who have a major say as to which parts of the industry 
are marketable, the nine Magnox reactors were withdrawn from the sale, 
and guarantees given for the remaining nuclear plant. This contradicts all 
previous cost claims by the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
and the Department of Energy (DEn) and must imply a revision of how we 
look at the history and economics of electricity, not only in the UK but in 
every EEC country with nuclear power. Apart from France this process is 
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The Scottish situation is a footnote to these developments. But it does 
show us what can happen when public policy is decided by institutions 
which are not publicly accountable, and where the political opposition, 
such as it was, lacked the costings of a p/s programme. Before we turn to 
this we look briefly at the main electricity industries of the EEC after 1973; 
the Government policies of the coal producers, which bring out the main 
tenets of public policy; the weakness of the coal industries as a political 
force; and the new role of the EEC Commission. 
Trends in EEC Electricity Production and Fuel Imports, 1973-1988 
Though electricity production by p/s in the EEC grew by 46.9% from 
1973 to 1988, with a stagnation in the worst of the recession from 1979 to 
1982, the trend of ouwut over the whole period varied considerably 
between member states l. In France output rose from 171,290 GWhours 
(GWh) in 1973 to 333,864 GWh in 1988, a rise of 94.9%. In fact all EEC 
countries apart from the UK registered sharp growth, with an EEC total 
increase of 46.9%. Despite the rise most forecasts from Governments and 
utilities, including the UK had overestimated the need for expansion. In 
England the industry exaggerated future electricity demand from the sixties 
until the recession of 1979-82 by as much as 25% per year. Thus the forecast 
made in 1974 for Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) maximum 
system demand in 1980 was 56 GW (thousand MW), yet the actual outturn 
was only 43 GW. UK electricity output went from 262,060 GWh in 1973 to 
278,736 GWh in 1979 and then fell in the recession to 253,228 GWh in 1982. 
There was little growth in CEGB area sales before 1984, though demand 
rose nearly 10% thereafter by 1987/88.<3) The overestimation had 
implications for the utilities in terms of finance and construction, and as we 
shall see for the long-run costs of nuclear plant, whose financial 
characteristics are quite different from coal p/s. (4) In France the over-
ordering of nuclear p/s left Electricite de France (EdeF) with a total debt of 
£35 billion by 1989 and a major crisis in the nuclear plant industry, though 
increases in electricity exports and sales at home have eased the burden. 
The worst case of excess in the EEC has been the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board (SSEB) where continued building has taken place since 
the sixties for which there was no possible justification. Units sold to 
customers increased from 17,160 GWh in 1973 to peak at only 18,524 GWh 
in 1979 followed by a fall in the recession. Demand in the SSEB area only 
rose above the 1979level in 1986 and all that could have been met by p/s 
finished prior to Inverkip and Hunterston B. 
Second, EEC coal, the main indigenous fuel for p/s, fac.ed stiff 
competition from MECs and national suppliers from South Africa, 
Columbia, Australia, Poland and the USA. Together they pushed up coal 
imports into the EEC from 41 million tonnes (mt) in 1975 to 81 mt in 1988. 
In Germany steam coal imports have not made much impact on the p/s 
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in line with increases in coal fired p/s demand and remained high when that 
demand fell, which hit the local industry very hard in the eighties. In the UK 
there has also been an impact on home production, with imports rising from 
2 mt in 1979 to 12.2 mt in 1988. 
Third, the massive price advantage given to coal by the oil rises of 1973 
and 1979 has not led to as much substitution as might be expected and in 
parts of the EEC, notably in Italy, oil use has actually increased. 
Consumption of oil in the EEC p/s fell from 76.4 mt to 32.4 mt in 1986, and 
in industry from 76.0 mt to 23.4 mt, with the fastest falls in Germany and 
France. Though oil companies have reduced the proportion of p/s fuel they 
make, the process of refining results in huge quantities which have to be 
burnt somewhere and periodic fluctuation in crude oil prices have also 
encouraged oil use. In the industrial market the capital costs of replacing oil 
by coal-fired plant (which has cheaper operating costs) proved less 
attractive in the eighties, even where Government aid has been available. 
Total coal-fired electricity output rose by 28.5% between 1973 to 1980 
(Table 2), helped by the rise in output from conventional stations and the 
fall in the use of oil, though gas provided some increase in competition, 
especially in Holland and Italy. But in the eighties EEC coal has also been 
worsted by the expansion of nuclear electricity generation whose part in 
total p/s output rose from 7.5% in 1973 to 39.0% by 1986. Because of this 
coal use stagnated in the eighties. The nuclear threat was more serious 
because utilities run merit orders for power stations with nuclear in 
operation all available time (Table 3). 



























Nuclear Energy Data OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, 1989. 
Improved energy efficiency in EEC economies has had some impact 
on electricity demand. For the performance of energy use in the EEC 
economies, the ratio of final energy consumption to gross domestic product 
(GDP), the EEC average improved by around 20% from 1973 to 1982, and 
















I~ ll!.ll:. 1111 jl~ 
'11.1'.1 ..1';. ~~I ~ 
l:.li ·I'·'' 







I ~~~ ~~ 









' :,11' 'I·' 
" 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1990 
component of GDP, which consumes around one-eighth ofthe energy for a 
similar value of output in industry. Pressures also came from the public 
sector and companies conscious of the contribution .a reduction in energy 
use would make to overall costs, as well as criticism from the Greens of 
industrial and household waste in the EEC. The UK managed an 18% 
improvement in the energy/GDP ratio from 1973 to 1982, but one-third of 
this was achieved by the collapse of several high energy use industries, and 
there was considerable leeway to make up with best household and 
industrial practice in the rest of the EEC. A small reduction in coal use may 
be attributed to improved p/s efficiency. (6) 
The cutbacks in steel production orchestrated by the EEC and 
improvements in steel technology affected the need for coke, the second 
largest EEC coal market, and demand fell from 87.5 mt in 1980 to 67.6 mt in 
1987. The sharpest fall was in the UK, where cokinf coal use fell from 19.6 
mt in 1976 to 11.3 mt in 1980 and to 10.9 in 1986Y The overall figures for 
EEC coal show that down to 1973 mine closures had cut output to 270 mt. 
The oil crisis implied that many mines which had been closed would have 
been profitable, but lack of investment prior to 1973 meant remaining 
mines required huge investment, or faced declining output, so closures 
continued. From 1979 to 1982 output stabilised at 242 mt a year. Further 
closures cut output to 195.4 mt in 1988. (S) 
Dominance of Energy Policy by the Nuclear Industry 
The decisions taken to expand nuclear power and coal imports have 
largely depended on the balance of power within the EEC energy 
establishments and the view taken by national Governments of the place of 
energy in their overall political economy. In two countries, the UK and 
France, the nuclear bias of the energy establishment was well established in 
energy decision-making by the 1960s. The manufacture of plutonium for 
the atom bomb meant a close relationship between the civil industry -
EdeF, CEGB and SSEB- and the defence industry, though there were 
limits to the number of plants required for manufacture of bomb materials. 
The growth of civil nuclear plant, a spin-off from the bomb programme, 
was justified on the grounds that it would be cheaper than coal and repeated 
technical problems written off as part of a "learning curve". 
In France in the seventies the expansion of electricity meant coal for p/ 
s more than doubled to 25.7 mt in 1979, and French output fell only slowly 
from 22.4 mt to 18.6 mt in 1980. But coal imports rose from 8.8 mt in 1974 to 
22.6 mt in 1980, and this undercut the arguments for more investme~t in the 
domestic industry. French nuclear power rose only slowly to reach 37,898 
GWh by 1979, or 16% of electricity output, but its rise thereafter was 
dramatic, reaching 260,178 GWh in 1988, or 78%. Coal deliveries to p/s fell 
to below 6 mt in 1988, and local output collapsed to under 12 mt, mostly for 
industry and household use. 
248 
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By 1987 indigenous coal was largely irrelevant, and the industry 
ministry condemned it to an irreversible decline<9>, despite some long and 
violent clashes over closures. Cost comparisons by EdeF of nuclear with 
coal have concentrated on the operating costs, which shows that nuclear 
plants are cheaper than coal for base load electricity. As we shall see below, 
a more realistic appraisal of full costs, including those for decommissioning, 
has serious implications for this type of comparison. In Belgium total 
output fell from only 7.5 mt in 1975 to 6.2 mt in 1985. However, the rise in 
South African and other imports to Antwerp from an average of 3.5 mt in 
the seventies to double that in the eighties, undermined the cost arguments 
for Belgian coal. Coal deliveries to p/s peaked at 6.4 mt in 1982, but the rise 
in nuclear output then halved deliveries. In 1988 69.6% of electricity 
generated in Belgium came from nuclear plant, and more came in from 
France. The last pit was closed in 1989. 
The basic public policy attitudes to French and Belgian mine closures 
were, first, the view which Government and electricity industry took, 
sooner in France than Belgium, that coal presented political problems and 
should be run down; second, that nuclear power was cheaper than coal or 
oil, or could be made to appear so; and third, that the MEC and other coal 
imports were cheaper than indigenous coal and that they could supply part 
of the fuel required for electricity and thus avoid investment in indigenous 
coal mines. The nuclear plant then took over in the eighties. These 
arguments determined policy, and set the parameters of what sort of 
economic analysis was acceptable. Thus though the Belgian ministry 
produced twelve volumes on the importance of Belgian coal to the rest of 
the economy in 1985 and 1986, it was ignored. So were the arguments 
produced by the CdeF, CFDT, and the CGT. Finally, nuclear power had a 
dramatic effect on coal deliveries to French and Belgian p/s, which in 1984 
were 26.6 mt, but by 1988 had fallen to 9.7 mt, which therefore reduced the 
volume of imports required, and simplified the market. 
In the UK the expansion of nuclear power has been more hesitant than 
in France, even in the eighties, and policy-makers had to confront the need 
for more investment in coal, which as discussed in the Scottish Government 
Yearbook 1989, was focussed in a few areas ofEngland.<10>Thus after 1979 
when Government policy concentrated on the elimination of coal as a 
political problem, nuclear power and MEC imports could only act as a 
partial substitute. Only a fraction of the 86 mt delivered to the CEGB p/s 
per year 1978-1983 was obtainable on the international market and most of 
that was priced above NCB coal. In any case British port facilities were 
inadequate and unreliable. 
The CEGB and SSEB have been central to post-1979 British 
Government policy and this had numerous financial and accounting 
implications for the nationalised industries. This was made easier for the 
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activities and the redrawing of the accounts to reduce NCB incomes in real
terms, and to show mounting losses, which were then cited as an example of
an overmanned, badly organised nationalised industry in Government
propaganda during the 1984/85 miners' strike. (Ill We may point to two lines
of policy which had an especial impact. (1) Fi·om 1979 the Government
ordered reductions in the price of NCB coal for p/s use in real terms. This
reduction in income cost the Board at least £500 million per year by 1984. 
(2) They imposed a two part pricing system in 1982 for the CEGB, and a 
version for the SSEB, whereby the smaller tranche was aligned with spot
prices at Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp (ARA). In subsequent 
negotiations with the NCB/BC this smaller tranche was increased in size, 
and subdivided. The 1984-85 dispute confirmed that the spot market - a 
relatively new trade - was too small to handle significant tonnages before 
rapid price increases intervened, and that UK infrastructure was weak. In 
essence, therefore, the Government used its political power over the NCB 
to impose a price system which was not justified by the conditions of the 
time. The CEGB argument in 1981 and 1982 that the spot price could be 
read as the average market price for long-run supplies was not supported by 
the figures from the Customs and Excise, or by European import prices 
reported to the EEC statistics office. In subsequent negotiations, and 
before the House of Commons Energy Committee in 1985, the CEGB went 
further and used the drop in prices after the miners' strike to argue that 30 
mt of imports were a viable option by 1992. Yet in their evidence to the 
Sizewell 'B' inquiry in 1982, the CEGB offered an entirely contradictory 
position. They argued that prices were dependent on long-run supply 
curves and all relevant costs including transport, and prices would thus rise 
well above current levels. Their three scenarios for the year 2000 in 1982 
prices ranged from $88 per tonne, to $105, and $141. Thus when arguing for 
increased nuclear power they pointed to the real conditions of supply and 
when berating the NCB/BC they argued that the spot price of a depressed 
commodity was a realistic surrogate for the market. 
The Role of the EEC against indigenous coal, and in favour of Nuclear 
Power. 
The EEC has advocated reductions in levels of deep mine EEC coal 
since the late fifties.<IZ) The pressure since then has been persistent, with 
few interruptions, notably in the aftermath of the 1974 and 1979 oil price 
rises. In their papers and research it is axiomatic that nuclear power is 
cheaper and cleaner than coal. 
The adoption of the internal market principle in the 1992 legjslation 
has given the EEC Directorate-General for Energy, DG 17, who cover 
nuclear power, coal, oil and gas, a pivotal role in the eighties which it lacked 
before. It is now realised that EEC electricity and fuel supplies policies will 
be crucial for the context of the national industries. As discussed below, it is 
especially critical to the survival ofEEC coal, which is the main impediment 
250 
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impediment to more nuclear power, and comparison of costs are central to 
the argument. 
The common thread of EEC proponents of coal closures has been the 
price of imported versus indigenous coal, and the price of nuclear electricity 
compared with coal fired. This has been a terrain that the coal industries 
largely lost and we need to explain why in some detail. In 1982 DG 17 
divided the 1981 EEC deep mined coal production of 250 mt into 3 
categories, (1) 50-60 mt which were fully competitive with imports, (2) 140-
150 mt which verged on being uneconomic (judged by import prices), (3) 40 
mt which were "fully uneconomic", and pressed for immediate closure.<13l 
Then in a secret report of November 1984 they went further. Production 
costs of the 229 mt dim output (1983) was matched against imported coal 
prices and 15% of EEC production was "hopelessly loss making ... whose 
closure is a question of time and social acceptability". A further 75 mt also 
required a subsidy which suggested closure within five years. <14) With only 
100-120 mt of production without subsidies, DG 17 recommended that half 
of EEC capacity be closed by 1990. They also divided the EEC coalfields on 
the basis of output per man shift, and those "whose productivity was below 
the Community average" which totalled 56,283,000 mt or 24.7% of 1983 
production. These guidelines included all the UK peripheral areas 
including Scotland, the North East, the North West, South Wales and 
Kent. <15) Financial and production criteria implied another 25% closures of 
up to 60 mt in Lorraine, Ruhr, Saar, Yorks and Notts. They demanded 
tighter investment criteria which recommended that investment 
"subsidies" would only be granted for the improvement of the economic 
viability of profitable or near profitable production capacity. (I 6l This was 
meant to imply not just output increases per se, but the much tighter criteria 
of what was profitable as laid down by DG 17's assessment of competitive 
with import prices. 
The other DG 17 arguments were similar to those used by EdeF and the 
CEGB: (1) There was excess capacity in export coal mines, and numerous 
suppliers: (2) This variety of supply minimised exchange rate risks: (3) EEC 
production costs would continue to rise, while likely import price rises 
would be contained to 2% per year, in real terms: ( 4) Costs of subsidy were 
high, and they had various secondary effects: (5) The "gigantic" 
expenditure on coal subsidies impeded the movement of factors of 
production from old processes to newer ones. Limited Government 
resources would be better employed in not subsidising coal and hindering 
such reallocation: and (6) They claimed that the social costs of closure 
would be temporary, and outweigh ted by the long-term commitment to 
coal production. (17) This coal argument is crucial because the EEC has 
always defended nuclear power as cheaper than coal. If therefore half of 
indigenous coal was more expensive than imports it would also be more 
costly than nuclear. In any case the Commission continued to press ahead 
with its own nuclear fusion projects, and to encourage more nuclear p/s 
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construction. 
DG 17 was wrong on all their basic premises. The international steam 
coal trade is not large, in 1983 it was 160 mt out of a world output of 4 billion 
tonnes.<ts) As with the CEGB, when it suifed them, they paid little 
attention to the long-run supply curves which underlay producer prices and 
the other add-on freight costs. What DG 17 used were EEC import prices of 
steam and coking coal, both one year and spot at ARA. All the coal 
information for the early eighties explained why prices fell after 1981, in 
essence because MECs and producers were prepared to modify their 
payback assumptions on their export mine investments, which with other 
creative accounting techniques, allowed the companies to cover several 
years of losses, or what would have been losses on previous assumptions. 
DG 17 proposed to offer 100-120 mt to these importers which would have 
raised the EEC import level from 60 mt (1983) to 160-180 mt. Long before a 
shift of this ma§nitude took place prices would have started to reflect full 
relevant costs.< l 
In the case of "subsidies" it was pointed out that the bulk were costs of 
pension funds, closure costs, and interest payments, all costs of past 
extraction which would continue regardless, or of public policy over the 
funding of the industry. <20) DG 17 never made clear why investment should 
be regarded as a subsidy. Implementation would have shorn half a million 
mining jobs from the EEC, and some hundreds of thousands indirectly. <21 ) 
Most of these miners lived in already depressed areas- Limburg, Nord pas 
de Calais, Lorraine, the Ruhr, Aachen and Scotland which had already 
been hard hit in the worst crisis since the war. DG 17 were taken to task on 
their assumptions as to monetary and income costs to Government of 
closures. The Rhineland-Westphalia Institute suggested that the Federal 
Government's borrowing requirement would rise by 20% if half their deep 
mines shut. (22) Perhaps the strangest omission in their report was the failure 
to comment on foreign exchange consequences. If the EEC had to buy 100-
120 mt, which like oil are priced in dollars, then this would have an adverse 
effect on the terms of trade. To hold the exchange rate constant would 
require an equivalent increase in manufactured exports from the EEC. If 
prices rose as trade rose, where would the benefit be for the EEC coal 
importing nations? The DG 17 took no account of the productivity changes 
wrought in the eighties by the NCB/BC computerisation programme or 
similar efforts in Germany, nor of the fractured market for coal buying. The 
EEC mining industry supported a mining equipment sector which bought 
equipment worth over $2.15 bn in 1983. The export trade reached $3 bn in 
that year. Their main competitor was the USA with a domestic .mining 
industry and a market of over 800 million tonnes. Why jeopardise this 
linked EEC industry? 
Of the four EEC deep-mine coal industries only Germany was 
prepared to reject the arguments for imports. German thinking was not just 
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that an economy benefitted from the contribution of all available resources 
and that care had to be taken to evaluate industrial linkages and multiplier 
effects of closures. It also invoked the relationshiup of their society to its 
economic activity, and the duties that ownership of enterprises entail 
towards society. German opposition forced the EEC to withdraw its 
proposals, which took a further dent after Chernobyl and the growth in 
scepticism in Germany about nuclear p/s costs. 
The argument against coal imports was easier because of the huge 
volume of market and cost information which is readily available. Dealing 
with the other part of the EEC agenda was problematic because the 
availability of financial information on nuclear power was restricted to a 
few electricity utilities and Governments who favoured more nuclear 
investment. DG 17 simply echoed the utilities' assurances that nuclear 
power would produce cheaper electricity than coal. As the main EEC 
institution supporting nuclear power their analysis of indigenous coal costs 
and the arguments they ( & EdeF and the SSEB) use against EEC coal and 
for imports are a crucial part of the economic case for nuclear power. As we 
noted above, if EEC coal closes, then the rise in coal import prices would 
make the case for nuclear power stronger. But the case made by DG 17 
weakened in the eighties with the increase of information about nuclear 
costs, which the privatisation ofthe UK industry exemplifies. The SSEB is a 
case in point. 
Planning Mistakes by the SSEB 
Electricity consumption in the SSEB area rapidly increased after 
nationalisation. <23) This led to the construction of Longannet and 
Cockenzie which provided 3,600 MW of state of the art large p/s with 
dedicated coal mines specially developed for the p/s market using the latest 
coal technology, in the mine, in blending, control rooms and p/s. The 
figures for overall output excluding SSEB p/s rose fast from 1968 to 1974 
from 11,893 GWh to 20,193 GWh, largely because of Longannet and 
Cockenzie, and the SSEB changed from a net importer of 882 GWh from 
the North Board in 1968 to a net exporter of 2127 GWh to the North by 
1972. These were two linked showpieces for Scottish industry. But instead 
of building on these and Scottish construction expertise to support an 
export drive, it was all thrown away in favour of two dead-end and 
expensive projects, Inverkip and Hunterston B, the latter with no export 
potential at all, and which looks set to plumb new depths of loss in the 
future. 
By the end of the fifties imported oil was delivered to p/s at usually 
below the cost of UK coal, though the price difference was not so great as to 
raise questionmarks about increased dependence on the MECs. By the 
mid-sixties the SSEB pushed through agreement on the 1980 MW Inverkip 
p/s based on the arguments that coal was (a) potentially unreliable, (b) oil 
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was cheaper, and (~) that demand would continue to rise. In fact the 
unreliability was not present in the coal industry until the Tory Government 
after 1970 decided to try and make it a (very) low wage industry. <24> Though 
the comparisons of fuel costs between coal and MEC oil were made prior to 
the cost reductions built into the new Longannet complex the advantage 
was not so robust as claimed. In 1965 and 1966 the price of oil exceeded or 
matched NCB delivered coal in Scotland (including transport) and did so 
again in 1969. The price difference perthermin 1967 and 1968was 14% and 
from 1970 to 1972, three years of oil advantage, 10.5%, but over the whole 
period 1965 to 1973 only 6.4%. Was this really such an advantage on which 
to base import dependence in a commodity? 
With the autumn of 1973 the case for oil p/s vanished. As Table 4 shows 
the oil price rise meant that in every single year from 1974 to 1982 oil cost 
more per GJ than NCB coal, the differential ranging from 22% in 1974 to 
38% in 1982. On these figures there was no financial case for burning large 
volumes of oil in any year from 1974 to 1982 but as Table 4 shows the SSEB 
continued to spend heavily on oil.<25> Figures after 1983 were distorted by 
the clash with the miners, though they show an even greater gap before 
1986. 
Table 4: Cost of Oil and Coal to SSEB, 1973-1988 
Fuel Consumption CostperGJ Price of Oil 
in pence above Coal 
Coal Oil Oil Coal by(%) 
1973 6,358,640 1,181,114 25.489 28.687 -11.15 
1974 6,987,459 918,419 34.579 28.114 22.99 
1975 7,010,962 963,273 73.019 45.377 60.09 
1976 8,158,733 402,954 89.998 61.911 45.37 
1977 7,832,625 334,283 109.023 72.727 49.91 
1978 7,728,620 507,628 115.046 84.990 35.36 
1979 7,592,889 981,170 113.824 95.135 19.64 
1980 8,002,763 458,164 129.488 117.729 9.99 
1981 7,307,022 178,376 192.437 143.936 33.70 
1982 7,550,856 152,070 217.415 157.094 38.40 
1983 4,649,238 85,494 260.022 169.851 53.09 
1984 4,463,010 76,012 283.448 173.499 63.37 
1985 2,392,081 1,658,222 369.183 156.791 135.46 
1986 6,252,908 64,120 535.513 187.363 185.82 
1987 4,503,089 365,424 134.197 175.068 -23.35 
1988 5,538,186 84,367 144.081 180.766 -20.29 
Source: SSEB Report and Accounts, 1973-1988. 
Note that 1 tonne of Scots coal was rated around 22,440 kj/kg, and 
1 tonne of oil was rated at about 42,934 kj/kg. 
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If the cost argument for oil was weak before 1973 so was the SSEB 
forecasting basis for Inverkip. The Scottish economy was in crisis long 
before 1973. Emigration was higher from Scotland in the sixties than any 
other European region for which figures exist except Malta, and industrial 
demand stagnated from 1969 to 1974. <26> In these six years total non-
domestic sales of electricity rose from 8028 GWh to only 8773 GWh. This 
left the domestic sector, but here demand had grown by only 1678 GWh 
from 1969 to 1974. Overall growth was 2423 GWh or 16% in the six years. 
And the rate of growth had slowed down in the sixties, from 9.6% in 1965/ 
66 to 7.5% in 1968/89 and to only6.7% over four years from 1971 to 1974, a 
rate of 1 'lz% per year. The domestic sales problem was stark with fierce 
competition from gas in cooking and heating systems, and potential 
saturation in the standing electric appliances which use most power, namely 
washing machines and refrigerators. The utility demonstrated in 1979/80 
that average savings of 22% per house (with a range of 15-45%) could be 
achieved with insulation and white meters. <27) With many closures in 
shipyards, mines and engineering plant, industry could not provide a 
sanguine outlook either. As the figures for the mid-seventies emerged it 
must have been clear, even to the SSEB chairman, that SSEB demand was 
stagnant, and that the crises of 1972 and 1974- blamed at the time- could 
not be attributed to something structural. Yet in 1974 the SSEB claimed 
that demand would be "four times as great at the end of the seventies as it 
was at the start of the sixties", and that it would continue to increase at a 
similar proportionate rate thereafter. Demand would be 30,000 GWh by 
1981. As we have seen the Board's own figures did not support such a 
prediction. 
From 1973 to 1979 electricity use in the SSEB area rose only 7.5% to 
18,524 GWh. It fell to a low of 17,397 GWh in 1983 and only managed to 
overtake the 1979 figure in 1986 and 1987, in part by sales of off -peak and 
white meter heating, at times when Scots least need it<28>, and by a rise in 
commercial sales from 3776 GWh in 1979 to 4295 GWh in 1987. Electricity 
sent out from p/s increased from 19,944 GWh in 1973 to 24,878 GWh in 
1979, or by 24.7%, mainly due to sales to the North Board for the 
Invergordon smelter. But 1979 also saw the maximum sent-out figure, and 
it fell as low as 19,338 GWh in 1983 after the closure of the smelter. By 
comparison with EEC demand this is not impressive. Moreover, domestic 
sales did not exceed the 1979 figure before 1988, and industrial sales 
stagnated in the eighties. The domestic base was 1,445,532 in 1979 which 
took 8009 GWh or 5540 units each, and though the total rose to 1,538,015 in 
1987, sales were only 7725 GWh and down to 5022 each. The mistakes over 
Inverkip and Hunterston B were compounded by the decision to build 
Torness. Altogether, I would contend, they have reduced the SSEB from a 
financially viable nationalised company, to a lame duck with an appalling 
public image which has to be bailed out by financial and asset 
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It can be argued that since 1926 there has been opposition from the 
Scottish establishment to mineworkers and coal. With the growth of the 
UK nuclear power industry, and the MECs foreign oil interests, there were 
alternatives which were eagerly grasped. From the early sixties, parallel 
with the spurious forecasting and the shaky cost claims, SSEB chairmen 
laid claim to the need for these wider energy sources. In 1974 after the oil 
crisis, for example, the chairman inveighed on the need for "diversity of 
primary fuels for electricity generation" crucial for reducing dependence on 
coal which he claimed was high cost, and insecure in supply. The SSEB 
target after the defeat of the Tory party, was that both "security and 
economy would be improved" by more nuclear plant and by gas and oil 
options when available. They have not deviated from their policy since. 
The discussion in Scotland has been conducted in the same narrowly 
conceived terms as in the DG 17 papers and by the CEGB and EdeF, and in 
particular the assurances on nuclear costs have not been questioned inside 
the policy process. Nor have we seen the detailed public justification for 
policy that there is in Germany, mainly because we have no equivalent to 
the powers of the German Lander, and the NCB is now outside the 
decision-making process, in contrast to the German companies. So the 
SSEB and the nuclear industry and their associates in Government sit 
isolated from criticism as advocate and jury in their own interest. 
Lack of Justification for Torness 
If the SSEB was to justify itself as a nuclear utility with the completion 
of Hunters ton B and Inverkip it would be expected to prove several things. 
(1) That demand would grow. Yet as we have seen demand was stagnant, 
and the prospects for the economy bleak. New capacity was not required 
for system maximum demand either; in 1979/80 this was 5861 MW, yet 
capacity was 10,227 MW or 74.5% above need. In January 1982 the smelter 
shut. Sales to England were an average of 592 GWh for each year 1978-81, 
and not encouraged by the disputes between the SSEB and the CEGB over 
the merits of the PWR and the AGR. (Z9) (2) That the AGR was as efficient 
as a coal station or more so. For the three years 1977 to 1979 the 
performance of the Hunterston B AGR unit one was poor, with a load 
factor of 31.2%, 39.6% and 41.3%, or an average of 37.4%. The second 
unit was shut down from October 1977 to February 1980 when it was 
flooded with sea-water. By 1988 the cumulative lifetime load factor of 
Hunterston B1 reactor was only 53.8%, and for the B2 reactor it was 
53.5%. Though this is the top end of British AGR performance, as a 
technology it compares adversely with most other nuclear systems. The 
Japanese, Canadians, Finns, and Swiss, for example, have had consistently 
better lifetime load factors. (30) (3) That Tomess would produce cheaper 
electricity than either Longannet or Cockenzie when all relevant costs were 
included. But Torness is an AGR and optimism on future efficiency is only 
assertion. As we explain below, the full costs are likely to be far higher than 
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an equivalent thermal station. And (4) That NCB deep mine coal was high 
cost and would remain so whatever the NCB did. This would be with 
reference to (a) coal imports, (b) opencast and private, (c) to nuclear power 
(q.v.), and (d) to gas and oil options. This implied that the arguments used 
by DG 17 would also be used, and indeed the SSEB tried to }?rove this point 
by importing coal in 1981182, and again in 1987 and 1988.( t) Yet BC costs 
and productivity have dramatically improved in recent years, and much 
production is now well under import prices. 
But the SSEB did not need to prove anything because the decision-
making process already favoured their position. To emphasise the point 
part of the cabinet sub-committee minutes endorsing the nuclear 
programme were given to the press in November 1979. Then in February 
1981 the Tory Government added four reasons for a 15,000 MW nuclear 
programme: (a) that nuclear plants would generate base load electricity at 
costs significantly below those of present or future thermal stations; (b) 
fossil fuel supply would diminish; (c) many p/s had to be refurbished by 
2000; and (d) a commitment was necessary to build up a viable British 
nuclear p/s industry capable of supplying domestic needs, and of seizing 
export opportunities. The political war on coal initiated at this time has 
been well documented in every respect from accounts, finances, NCB 
Board composition, to the tasks for the police and security services. 
Each one of the reasons for this AGR, and its brother at Heysham, 
were painstakingly analysed and rejected by the House of Commons 
Energy Committee in 1980 and 1981. The Committee criticised the 
forecasts about demand, the increases in planning margins, the wilful 
neglect of the depression and stagnant power use, of competition from gas, 
as well as market saturation and conservation. They noted that the 
Secretary of State for Energy had used historic cost figures for nuclear and 
coal capacity, but had admitted these were not valid comparisons. The 
Department was criticised for producing misleading figures and their 
habitual secrecy. The rise in the cost of new AGRs by 25% in real terms in 
the year to April1980 was noted, as were the increases of90% in real terms 
in reprocessing estimates in the previous five years. The export potential 
was ridiculed. An expert demolition of the case for Torness was made by 
former Conservative MP Michael Ancram. He went through the main 
financial and engineering criticisms of Torness much as an investment 
analyst would do, and added that it was not clear there would be any net 
gain in jobs, as most of the orders would go outside Scotland, and the coal 
mining industry would lose heavily once Torness was on stream. He also 
criticised the lack of effective supervision of the SSEB by the Scottish 
Office. 
Importance of Relevant Accounting Systems 
The Committee report mentioned accounting issues crucial to the 
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argument for and against nuclear power. A p/s system would normally 
include a flow of income which is put aside as depreciation for replacement, 
so much per year over the life of the p/s. But with rapid inflation a system 
which uses the historic cost of a p/s will generate insufficient funds for 
replacement. Therefore the utility will have to borrow or issue shares. For 
the building programme of the SSEB the rate of capital expansion for most 
of the seventies could not be covered by past earnings. In the early seventies 
the internal financing ratio was under 40%, it rose above 100% in only 
three years before 1981, and fell back below 40% after 1984 because of 
Torness. Moreover, the SSEB continued to use historic cost accounting 
(HCA), plus supplementary depreciation, for replacement, which meant 
that asset values were understated, therefore making the earnings ratio 
more attractive. But this supplementary depreciation was recognised in the 
seventies as entirely insufficient for replacement and for all costs arising out 
of the nuclear plant, including reprocessing and decommissioning. (JZ) 
We can explore this further by reference to Table 5, which shows the 
accounts presented to the world as HCA, and Table 6, as required by the 
City, the CCA standard. These indicate a number of serious contradictions. 
The drastic price increases in the early eighties gave the utility a sharp 
increase in profit, which grew faster than total income. With additional 
depreciation at a notional value and falling in real terms over the decade 
1978 to 1987, operating profit (HCA) grew in real terms, with surprising 
speed after 1985. But it grew in step with interest payments, the growing 
burden of building Torness. So the bottom line surplus was low, never 
exceeding £23m. On the CCA calculation the position was far worse. 
Though the CCA operating adjustments did not grow in line with inflation 
(they fell in real terms 1979 to 1987) when added to interest payments it 
shows a Joss, with a modest increase in real terms from 1978/79. Thus 
changes in the CCA operating adjustments, or increases in prices could 
push these figures into huge profits, or huge losses. The return on CCA 
assets, a main indicator used by the City, was under 2 and 3%. 
The problem shown by the accounts do not stop there. If the SSEB had 
ceased building after Longannet and Cockenzie they would require to 
replace part of this plant from the late 1990's, and costs would include 
demolition and returning the site to green status. This would be easily 
containable, and in any case the p/s have much recyclable material. 
The three nuclear plants represent an entirely different problem. (1) 
They are much more expensive, with a capital cost of 50% to 100% more 
for each MW of power, and the real cost is higher because of the longer 
construction time, and the delays in comissioning, which add· to the 
financial burden. (2) The operating costs. During 1989 much information 
was leaked by the CEGB as to the real costs of day-to-day operations in 
their nuclear stations. It became clear by 1982 when the Invergordon 
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twenty year old NCB/ Alcan agreement for the smelter in the North East. In 
the case of the English AGRs the operating costs are in line with those 
which have emerged in the eighties from the United States which indicate 
that half way through the life of a nuclear plant operating costs rise above 
those of coal. (3) British Nuclear Fuels plc related costs. BNFL is a public 
limited company whose principal shareholder is the Department of Energy. 
It manufactures, reprocesses and stores nuclear materials, and since 
formation in 1971 the great bulk of its business has been on a cost plus basis 
under which BNFL passes on all its costs and liability for future costs to the 
SSEB and the CEGB. The SSEB and CEGB have signed a full cost plus 
contract with BNFL to run for a decade from the opening of a new thermal 
oxide reprocessing plant (Thorp). In 1977 the plant cost was given as 
£300m, in 1988 it reached £1 ,480m. Some ofthe basic engineering problems 
are unsolved, and the throughput is expected to be lower than expected, 
and thus unit charges higher. Other BNFL expenditure involves £2.1 bn by 
1995. Most aspects of BNFLs work have been subject to real price rises, for 
example in 1987-88 unit charges rose by 129% for AGR fuel fabrication, 
20% for Magnox fuel and 27% for Magnox reprocessing. <33l The cost plus 
nature of this reprocessing contract mean that CCA accounting cannot give 
an accurate view of future costs . 
This would be bad enough, but CEGB documents leaked in May 1989 
indicate that the situation is much worse. BNFL manufactures uranium fuel 
rods for Magnox and AGRs. After use the highly radioactive spent fuel is 
removed and sent to Sellafield for eventual reprocessing or storage. At 
present only part of the Magnox fuel is reprocessed, and the AGR fuel 
awaits completion of Thorp. Before reprocessing the spent fuel is stored in 
five huge ponds. Against all the estimates of the engineers, the AGR and 
Magnox fuel elements are corroding, seeping radioactivity into the pond 
water. In 1986 the Atomic Energy Authority began testing some of the 
Hunterston B fuel elements stored at Sellafield. One had a major failure 
after just 114 days in the reactor pond, and 3'/, years at Sellafield, three 
other elements were releasing radioactivity after 130 days in the 
Hunterston pond and one year at Sellafield. One pin was so corroded it 
broke when dropped from a height of one metre. Most of the 6000 AGR 
elements in Sellafield No.4 pond were releasing radioactivity. The more 
corroded the elements the more work will have to be done manually, and 
therefore the more costly the process will be. <34l The CEBG papers confirm 
what the House of Commons Energy Committee suspected, that 
reprocessing will escalate in price, and therefore the provisions in the SSEB 
accounts are quite inadequate. Moreover, Lord Marshall wrote to Peter 
Walker in February 1988 suggesting that by 1993 all the AGRs would have 
to be shut as space for storage will run out, and he and his staff admitted that 
Friends of the Earth had been right all along to insist on dry storage, and not 
bother with wet storage or Thorp. 
But this is not all. (4) Decommissioning of Nuclear Plant. The UK 
261 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1990 
Government and the Scottish Office has steadfastly maintained that the 
utilities nuclear power would be privatised as well as the thermal. But the 
question of decommissioning costs has again shown that earlier cost 
assurances such as those given to the Commons Energy Committee in 1980 
and 1981 are nonsense. On 20th July 1989 the· Financial Times Power in 
Europe reported that the latest electricity industry estimates put the charge 
from the BNFL for decommissioning the Berkeley Magnox at £487 m to 
£641 m depending on the timescale involved, with £200m in the first stage. 
Yet this Magnox is only 5% of total Magnox capacity and BNFL charge on a 
cubic foot basis. Power in Europe suggested £3.5 bn as a possible final bill, 
and the same day the Labour Energy spokesman, Tony Blair, claimed that 
costs could reach £4.5 bn for the eight Magnox reactors of the utilities. On 
25 July 1989 Cecil Parkinson, in one of his last acts as Energy Secretary, 
announced that the Magnox reactors would be retained in the public sector, 
thereby overturning what the Tories had been stating on privatisation ofthe 
nuclear power plant. <35> He also went so far as to admit the utilities had not 
made proper provision for decommissioning. Then on the 29 July the 
Department of Energy admitted the total cost of decommissioning of all the 
Magnox reactors, not just the SSEB and CEGB plant, could reach £15 bn, 
to be paid for by taxpayers. When we put these financial points together, we 
can see why several stockbrokers in the summer of 1989 were demanding 
the removal of all nuclear plant from privatisation and suggesting that 
retention would involve a negative asset valuation. 
The nuclear industry in the UK has never been publicly accountable. It 
has its own secret police, and until recently was given a blank cheque to 
construct whatever plant it thought fit. The full costs of nuclear p/s, 
building, operating costs, interest charges, reprocessing, storage, transport 
costs, and decommissioning are now agreed by the same Department of 
Energy who denied it for so long to be above costs for coal, gas and oil p/s 
electricity. The cost escalations ferreted out in 1988 and 1989 by the House 
of Commons, by the Science Policy Research Unit, the Financial Times and 
the City, and leaked by the CEGB, have demolished the case for all past 
nuclear p/s and BNFL plants built in the UK. We thus follow the path ofthe 
USA where similar revelations have stopped civil nuclear work there. Up 
to now the UK and the Scottish establishment, academics, media, and 
politicians both Labour and Conservative have supported this programme. 
The few mavericks who opposed nuclear power were outside the policy 
process and ignored. As all this happened under public ownership it must 
raise questions about the form of democratic controls of nationalised 
industries and why we had to wait for privatisation to have sight of the real 
story. 
Conclusion 
The argument between EEC coal and nuclear power is one of the 
major economic clashes of the post-war era. It has already destroyed much 
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of the coal industry and done serious damage to coal-related industries and 
regions. The economic case for nuclear power has been based on the 
flimsiest of cost assessments, and though these look weaker as each month 
passes, the institutional support for the nuclear industry will continue to 
protect it. 
The main EEC wide protection for nuclear power in the nineties will 
come from DG17. We should be quite clear about their role. While they 
continue to attack German and other coal support their concern does not 
extend to nuclear subsidies. Indeed, DG 17 have specifically endorsed the 
proposals put to them by the Department of Energy on UK privatisation, 
whereby the nuclear industry would be a protected supplier to the Area 
Boards, and able to charge higher prices. They continue to support the 
subsidies to the EEC fusion project, despite mounting evidence of its 
multiple failings. In 1988 and 1989 DG 17 pressed for closure of another 80-
100 mt of EEC coal. 
In Scotland the SSEB and the rest of the nuclear industry had absorbed 
huge numbers of technicians and scientists and public funds and used them 
for various obsolete technologies, including the AGR system, and the 
Dounreay fast breeder. If the energies of these scientists had been directed 
to other industries, including coal, then the Scottish economy might have 
weathered the last twenty years in better shape. As for coal the strides in 
new coal related technology, in chemicals, mining equipment, computer 
systems, environmentally clean power stations, will ensure that coal has a 
bright future. But they are being developed outside Scotland. Thus the 
coal-nuclear confrontation has ensured that another part of the supply side 
of the Scottish economy has virtually disappeared. 
Richard Saville, Department of Modern History, University of St 
Andrews. 
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BUILDING THE MERCHANT CITY: 
SOME LESSONS IN URBAN REGENERATION 
Jack Brand 
For the first sixty years of this century, Glasgow was a city on the way 
down. (t) By the 1970s, this was evident even in the city centre, with the west 
end of Sauchiehall Street: once a major centre of fashion: looking tatty and 
peppered with closed shops. Even worse was the historic centre running 
from the medieval High Street to Buchanan Street: the Merchant City. (Z) 
Since 1980 this central area has been returned to prosperity. This 
chapter will examine how this was done, not for the sake of the Glasgow 
story alone, but for the lessons we can learn for urban regeneration 
elsewhereY> This is particularly appropriate now, when the Government 
has set up Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) to manage the 
regeneration of inner city areas in England and Wales. <4> Parkinson points 
out that the philosophy of the UDCs is to remove the process of 
improvement from the local authorities, which are considered to be too 
political and inefficient, and to place it with an authority which has no local 
democratic responsibilities and is accountable only to the Government. (S) 
In the rebuilding of the Merchant City, we shall show that Glasgow 
District Council was the essential first mover and the body which, even up 
to the present moment, has forced the pace of change. This is all the more 
remarkable when one considers that Glasgow has had a Labour-dominated 
council, with breaks totalling only eight years, since 1933. <6> Even with this 
background, it has worked happily with developers and others in the 
private sector, and its cooperation with Scottish Development Agency 
(SDA) has brought outstanding results. 
It is clear that several agencies cooperated in Glasgow as opposed to 
the strategy of concentrating decision making and implementation in an 
Urban Development Corporation. I shall argue that there were clear 
advantages in that the local authority was able to do things which the SDA, 
or a UDC, could not do. By the same token, the Agency worked as a 
catalyst in the relationship between the Council and the Developers under 
certain circumstances; not just by providing more money, but also by its 
attitudes and its record. 
Finally, the events in Glasgow reveal something about the role of 
elected members in local government. It has been suggested that one 
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